mostlymissiledefense

Updated List of Claims about GMD Effectiveness (May 20, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Mon, 20 May 2013 18:39:56 +0000

Claims by U.S. government officials about the effectiveness of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. This iteration adds seven additional claims (some old, some new). In order to facilitate future updates, they are now in chronological rather than reverse chronological order.

(1) September 1, 2000: “… I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time.” President Bill Clinton, at Georgetown University, September 1, 2000.

(2) March 18, 2003: “Effectiveness is in the 90% range.”[1] Edward Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

(3) March 23, 2003: “There are a lot of things that go into [determining] effectiveness. Everybody can be right.” [2] MDA Director Ronald Kadish, in response to a question about Aldridge’s statement.

(4) March 14, 2006: “When the president declares limited defensive operational capability, we are prepared as the shooter, if you will, to execute the mission to defend our country. And I’m very confident in the efficacy of that system.”[3] Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command.

(5) June 2006: “(From) what I have seen and what I know about the system and its capabilities I am very confident.”[4] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(6) July 6, 2006: “If it headed to the United States, we’ve got a missile defense system that will defend our country.” President George W. Bush in response to a question on Larry King Live about North Korea’s unsuccessful test of a long-range ballistic missile the day before.

(7) September 1, 2006: “I would say that if we had to use the system in an operational mode, it would be very capable.”[5] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.

(8) October 2, 2007: “ - does the system work? The answer to that is yes. Is it going to work against more complex threats in the future? We believe it will.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.[6]

(9) November 2, 2008: “I have very high confidence we could defend the United States against that threat.”[7] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, about one or two missiles launched from North Korea.

(10) March 27, 2009: “And Senator, I’ll tell you, if we felt the North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system able to meet that threat.”[8] General Victor Renaurt, Commander U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command.

(11) June 9, 2009: “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”[9] And “I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

(12) June 16, 2009: Confidence that a North Korean missile could be shot down is: “ninety percent plus.”[10] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(13) June 18, 2009 (approximately): “I’d believe we have a reasonable chance” of intercepting a North Korean missile. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary, in an interview on his last day in the job.[11]

(14) July 28, 2009: “Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.”[12] MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.

(15) April 21, 2010: “It is the belief of the — of the leaders of this department that we have the capability to defend the United States against the — against an ICBM threat from a rogue nation such as Iran or North Korea. We are confident in the system we have at this point.”[13] Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary.

(16) December 1, 2010: “…the probability will be well in the high 90s today of the GMD system being able to intercept that today.” MDA Director Patrick O’Reilly in response to a question from Representative Trent Franks about countering “one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York.”[14]

(17) April 13, 2011: “The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.”[15] Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.

(18) December 12, 2012: “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in response to a question from CNN on the capability of U.S missile defenses, December 12, 2012.[16]

(19) March 7, 2013: “I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack. And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea. But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.” White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in response to a question at White House Daily Press Briefing, March 7, 2013.[17]

(20) March 15, 2013: “We have confidence in our system. And we certainly will not go forward with the additional 14 interceptors until we are sure that we have the complete confidence that we will need. But the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.” Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in response to a question at a Pentagon press conference, March 15, 2013.

(21) April 9, 2013: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies. Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013 in response to a question about intercepting North Korean missiles.[18]

(22) May 8, 2013: “We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall about the capability of “our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”[19]

(23) May 9, 2013: “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional ’14 provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.” Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall (and referring to the recently announced plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska).[20]

[1] BAYH: Let me withdraw the question and move on. I think you see where I was heading.

Let me ask you Mr. — Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness of the system that’s to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in protecting against this developing North Korean threat — the 10 land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004 — how effective would they be against the North Korean missile if it were, in fact, launched against our country?

ALDRIDGE: Well, we think that it would be effective. Probably shouldn’t go into a lot of details of…

BAYH: Well, how do you define effective — 90 percent success rate — 75 — 50?

ALDRIDGE: Yes, sir — you would — and you — the way you could achieve these rates is you don’t have to fire just one interceptor per target, you could fire two, as we do in PAC-3.

BAYH: Of course.

ALDRIDGE: And so the effectiveness is in the 90 percent range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough that we never have to use these things. I mean, that’s the ultimate effectiveness is that they’re never used.

BAYH: There are — there are — there are — there are 10 going online in 2004 — 10 in 2005. The radar is not going to be available — when will that go into place — 2006?

ALDRIDGE: Well, General Kadish has probably got the specific dates for all of those. Let him…

KADISH: We’ll have radars online to handle the early warning and usefulness of the system in ’04, when we put the missiles on alert if everything works out all right. We’ll add the sea-based X-band (ph) if it proves out by — the following year — it’s currently scheduled by September of ’05.

BAYH: So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal year ’04 and the radar that will be online at that time, we would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down a NATO (ph) Dong II?

ALDRIDGE: Well, it depends on — a lot depends on the continuation of the — of the test and the effective — this precise effectiveness numbers. But I would put — you know, as of today, the projected effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range.
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2003.

[2] Randy Barrett. “Lawmakers Question Effectiveness of Missile Defense System.” Space News, March 24, 2003, p. 6.

[3] Jason Sherman, “Experts Question U.S. System’s Ability To Intercept North Korean Missile,” Inside Missile Defense, June 21, 2006.

[4] Robert Burns, “Missile Defense Chief Confident in Ability To Hit Missile,” The Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 23, 2006.

[5] Pentagon Briefing, September 1, 2006.

[6] “DoD News Briefing with Gen. Renuart and Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.”, October 2, 2007.

[7] “Obama To Be Told U.S. Missile Defense Capable, General Says,” CNN.com, November 2, 2008.

[8] Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2009.

[9] “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”

“I was just in Fort Greely last week, and its an immensly capable system.” And one of the things that I think is important to remember is, it is still a developmental system. It has real capabilities, and I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 9, 2009.

[10] SEN Bayh: I’ve bumped up against my time limits here, but there was one final question. You’re briefing the President of the United States. He asks you based on — you know, he’s got to take into consideration what you’re doing in terms of facing these threats. He asks you if there is a rogue launch, what are the percentages that we’re going to be able to hit it and bring it down, what would you tell him?

GEN. O’Reilly: Ninety percent plus.

SEN. Bayh: Ninety percent plus confidence that we could — if there’s a rogue launch from North Korea, let’s say, we could intercept that target and bring it down?

Gen. O’Reilly: Yes. Sir.

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009.

[11] Viola Gienger, “Gates: Take Defense Steps,” The Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 2009.

[12] Gen O’ Reilly: ‘Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea. The testing we have done to date, we have a lot of testing still to do against all our capability in all scenarios, but in the scenarios out of North Korea, we have intercepted three times out of Fort Greely, Alaska. The missiles, we actually test them out of Vandenberg, but they’re up at Fort Greely. And then for Hawaii, we have multiple systems (inaudible). A theater high-altitude-area defense system, its an Army mobile system, and then we have the Navy Aegis system. And we also have the…” Margaret Brennan, “US Missile Defense Director Patrick O’Reilly on Bloomberg TV,” Bloomberg TV, July 28, 2009.

[13] “DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4612. Morrell is the Pentagon Press Secretary.

[14] Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, December 1, 2010.

[15] “Now what does that mean? The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures. And against this threat, we have the current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to come in the defense of the homeland with the future deployment in 2020 time frame of SM-3 2B.” Opening statement of Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2011.

[16] Bradley Clapper, “U.S. Hesitant in Condemning North Korean Launch,” The Associated Press, December 13, 2012.

[17]The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” March 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-372013

[18] SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that we have the ability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as is widely reported they would do in coming days.

ADM. LOCKLEAR: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the Homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.

SEN.MCCAIN: Do we have the capability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several days?

ADM. LOCKLEAR: We do.

[19] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

[20] Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.

East Coast Interceptor Site: Some Observation’s from this Week’s Congressional Hearings (May 11, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Sat, 11 May 2013 16:49:23 +0000

A possible east coast site for interceptors for the current U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system was the subject of multiple questions at Thursday’s (May 9, 2013) hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Administration and military officials emphasized that the east coast of the United States was already protected by the current GMD system. They also said that if a decision to deploy such an east coast interceptor site was made, it would take five to seven years to build and would also involve the deployment of a new X-band radar in the eastern United States.

Senator Mark Udall began by asking Lt. General Richard Formica (Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, of the U.S. Strategic Command): “Secretary of Defense Hagel, Admiral Winnefeld and General Jacoby have all said recently that the current ground- based midcourse defense system defends all of the U.S., including the East Coast, against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran. In your capacity as commander within Strategic Command, you represent the warfighter perspective on our missile defense capabilities and requirements. Do you have confidence in our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”

General Formica replied: “Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the question. We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future. “

Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, added (referring to the additional fourteen interceptors in Alaska that the Administration announced in March): “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional fourteen provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.”

In response to a question from Senator Deb Fischer, General Formica stated (referring to the required Environmental Impact Statement) that “depending on the assumptions and how fast the EIS goes, five to seven years” would be needed to deploy an east coast interceptor site, with eighteen to twenty four months of this time needed for the Environmental Impact Statement. He also estimated that about 500 military and civilian personnel would be required to operate the site.

(A day earlier, in a House Armed Services Committee hearing, Representative Doug Lamborn urged Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Admiral James Syring to recommend that President Obama waive the requirement for an environmental impact statement in order to speed up the possible deployment of the east coast site. Admiral Syring seemed to be unaware that this was possible (and I don’t know if it is either)).

General Formica also indicated that such a deployment would involve a new X-band radar in the eastern United States:

Senator Fischer: “OK. And would such a site benefit from the deployment of an X-band radar on the East Coast?”

General Formica: “Yes, ma’am. Back to my point on sensoring and assessment and discrimination capability, an X-band radar, frankly, anywhere east would greatly benefit the threat that I and we in the agency see coming. And certainly that would be part of it.”

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System Versions (May 7, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Tue, 07 May 2013 20:49:20 +0000

This post briefly describes the various versions of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon System. See the post of May 2 for a description of the different versions of the Aegis BMD interceptor missiles.

Aegis BMD 3.0E: The first deployed Aegis BMD capability was the Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and Tracking (LRS&T) capability using the Aegis BMD 3.0E software. Thus upgrade allowed forward-based Aegis ships to track long-range ballistic missiles and relay this information back for possible use by the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. Several Aegis BMD 3.0E destroyers were forward-deployed in the Pacific as part of the initial GMD Limited Operations Capability in September 2004.

Aegis BMD 3.0: This version provided the first SM-3 engagement capability against ballistic missiles. This “Preliminary Engagement Capability” was intended to provide an emergency capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using the SM-3 Block I interceptor. It also included the LRS&T capability. The first intercept test (successful) using Aegis BMD 3.0 was in February 2005 (FTM-04-1).

Aegis BMD 3.0 was first operationally deployed in spring 2005. This included the deployment of several SM-3 Block I interceptors (of which less than ten were then in existence) aboard the cruiser USS Lake Erie. One other cruiser, the Port Royal, was also upgraded to Aegis BMD 3.0. A significant limitation of Aegis BMD 3.0 was that a ship equipped with it could only perform the BMD mission and not the air defense mission.

Aegis BMD 3.6: Aegis 3.6 was intended to provide engagement capabilities against short-, medium and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles using the new SM-3 Block IA interceptor. Unlike Aegis 3.0 ships, Aegis 3.6 ships were capable of all three missions: ballistic missile engagement, long-range surveillance and tracking, and air defense. Aegis 3.6 was also intended to add a limited launch-on-remote capability using data from another Aegis ship.

Aegis 3.6 was first intercept tested (successfully) in June 2006 (FTM-10) on the Cruiser USS Shiloh, which became the first 3.6 equipped ship in the spring of 2006. It was certified for tactical deployment by the U.S. Navy in September 2006.[1] By the end of 2006, the first destroyer equipped with 3.6 was also operational.

Aegis BMD 3.6.1: Aegis 3.6.1 added a terminal, within-the-atmosphere (endo-atmospheric) ballistic missile defense capability to Aegis 3.6 using the SM-2 Block IV interceptor. Aegis 3.6.1 was first intercept tested (with a SM-2 Block IV) in June 2008 in the successful FTM-14 test.

Aegis 3.6.1 increases the system’s launch-on-remote capabilities by enabling use of data from non-Aegis sensors such as TPY-2 X-band radars and Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites.

All U.S. BMD capable ships have now been upgraded to at least the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 capability. The four current Japanese Aegis BMD destroyers are also equipped with Aegis 3.6.1 or a very similar capability.[2]

Aegis BMD 4.0.1: Aegis 4.0.1 is often described as the “second generation” Aegis BMD system. It is still under development, although the Aegis 4.0.1 computer program has already been installed on several ships. It will add both a new Aegis BMD Signal Processor (BSP) and the new SM-3 Block IB interceptor.

The Aegis BSP signal processor is intended to improve the discrimination capabilities of the Aegis system’s SPY-1 radar. The BSP “enables tracking of individual objects and uses advanced algorithms to identify various objects.”[3] “The Aegis BMD Signal Processor (BSP) provides a real-time identification capability through signal processing. Such processing enables tracking of individual objects and identification though the use of advanced algorithms.”[4]

The Aegis 4.0.1 computer system, and in particular the new signal processor, had been used to observe a number of tests before it was used in an actual intercept attempt.[5] The first intercept test for Aegis 4.0.1 was in September 2011 (FTM-16 E2), although the Block IB interceptor failed to hits is target due a malfunction in its third-stage motor.

The MDA has stated that a 3.6.1 ship can be upgraded to the 4.0.1 system for $45 to $55 million.[6]

Aegis BMD 4.0.2: According to the MDA, this is the Aegis BMD version that was employed in the successful FTM-20 intercept test of February 12, 2013 (which is the only context in which I have seen this designation used).[7] This is likely a new version of the 4.0.1 program to correct for the problem discovered in the FTM-16 E2 intercept test failure, which was due to a problem with the third stage rocket motor thrust pulses. According to the GAO, “a new version of the second generation Aegis weapons system” was developed “to control the amount of time between the pulses,” and that this change “will have minimal consequences on missile performance and ship operations.”[8]

Aegis BMD 5.0. Primarily not about adding new capabilities to the system, this version integrates the Aegis BMD 4.0 system into the Navy’s new Open Architecture modernized version of the Aegis computer system (rather than have the BMD capability on separate adjunct computers as is done in earlier Aegis BMD version) with both anti-aircraft and ballistic missile defense capabilities. The modernized Aegis computer system (Baseline 9) uses commercial-off-the shelf computer infrastructure to enable faster system upgrades and increased commonality, and to facilitate the addition of BMD capabilities to additional ships. However, Aegis 5.0 will apparently not have the within-the-atmosphere terminal-phase BMD capability that Aegis 4.0 has. Several ships have already been upgraded to the Aegis 5.0 BMD computer system.

Aegis BMD 5.0 CU (capability upgrade) is intended for deployment by 2015. This restores a terminal within-the-atmosphere BMD capability with the Sea-Based Terminal Increment 1 using SM-2 Block IV and modified SM-6 interceptors.[9] It also expands and updates the Aegis Baseline 9 MRBM and IRBM threat set to include EPAA Phase II threats and increases the maximum number of SM-3 missiles that can be simultaneously in flight to be able to deal with larger attacks. The Aegis Ashore system scheduled for Romania in 2015 will initially be deployed with Aegis BMD 5.0 CU (although apparently without the terminal interceptors).

Aegis BMD 5.1 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2018. It will integrate the new high-speed SM-3 Block IIA interceptor onto U.S. and Japanese ships. It will have improved data links to permit engage-on-remote operation and will be able to engage longer-range missiles, including all IRBMs. It will improve terminal phase capabilities with addition of the Sea-Based Terminal Increment 2 (I don’t know how this differs from Increment 1) using modified SM-6 interceptors. The Aegis Ashore site scheduled for Poland in 2018 will initially be deployed with Aegis 5.1.

[1] Martin Stieff, “BMD Watch: U.S. Navy Certified Aegis 3.6,” UPI September 19, 2006.

[2] According to the Congressional Research Service, the Japanese ships have “at least an approximate equivalent of the 3.6.1 version of the Aegis BMD System.” Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, RL33745, March 14, 2013, p. 11.

[3] MDA, “FTM-18 Fact Sheet” June 22, 2012. Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/Aegis_FTM-18_FactSheet.pdf

[4] MDA, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense FTM-16 Factsheet,” August 22, 2011, Available at: http://www.stratcom.mil/files/FTM-16%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20v13.pdf.

[5] MDA, “FTM-16 Fact Sheet.”

[6] O’Rourke, p. 3.

[7] Vice Admiral J. D. Syring, “Ballistic Missile Defense Update,” presentation to the American Society of Naval Engineers, February 22, Slide 15.

[8] GAO-13-432, p. 53.

[9] PB 2014 Missile Defense Agency, PE 0603892C: Aegis BMD, April 2013, p. 2a-343.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors (SM-3, SM-2 Block IV, and SM-6) (May 2, 2012)

mostlymissiledefense — Thu, 02 May 2013 15:39:05 +0000

The SM-3 is the U.S Navy’s current exo-atmospheric (above-the-atmosphere) ballistic missile defense interceptor. It is based on the airframe of the SM-2 Block IV extended-range air defense interceptor, including its two solid-fuel rocket stages. However the SM-3 replaces this missile’s explosive warhead and radar seeker with an additional solid-fuel third-stage motor and an infrared-homing, hit-to-kill kill vehicle.

SM-3 Block 0 was an initial version built only for testing. It was similar to the subsequent Block I version but had specific features added for testing, such as pressure gauges in fuel tanks and rocket motors and an “independent flight termination system.”[1] The Block 0 was used in the first five intercept tests (FM-2 through FM-6).

SM-3 Block I was a limited production version that provided the first operational Aegis BMD intercept capability aboard the USS Lake Erie in spring 2005. Only eleven Block Is were built, and four of these were expended in tests (FTM-04-1, FTM-04-2, and Pacific Blitz (2)).

The SM-3 Block IA is the first production version of the SM-3 (the “tactical” missile). It was first deployed on the USS Shiloh in spring 2006, as part of the initial Aegis BMD 3.6 deployment.

Relative to the Block I, the IA has greater processing capability for improved IR discrimination and eliminated some obsolescence issues and increased missile lifetime.

The Block IA also has significantly greater divert capabilities. Starting with the FM-5 intercept test (Block 0, 06/18/2003) an upgraded version of the kill vehicle’s solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS) was employed. This version of the SDACS has an initial sustain pulse followed by two smaller pulses that provide additional divert capability. The FM-5 intercept failure was due to a SDACS valve failure involving these two smaller pulses. Although a repaired version of the valve was used in the pulsed SDACS for the Block I missiles, all of these missiles had the two subsequent pulses disabled. These pulses were eventually restored in the Block 1A interceptors.

The SM-3 Block IA was first intercept-tested (successfully) in June 2006 and is the version of the SM-3 now deployed on U.S. and Japanese BMD-capable ships. According to the Congressional Research Service, as of early 2012, a total of 125 SM-3 Block IAs were to be procured, with deliveries to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2014.[2]

Figure 1. Aegis SM-3 Block IA and Block IB interceptors. Image source: Laura DeSimone, “Aegis BMD; The Way Ahead,” MDA Briefing Slides, December 6, 2011 (available at: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011PEO/DeSimone.pdf )

The SM-3 Block IB interceptor uses essentially the same missile body as the Block IA, but adds an entirely new kill vehicle with an enhanced infrared seeker, faster processor and improved divert and attitude control system. After an unsuccessful intercept test in September 2011 (FTM-16 E2), the SM-3 Block IB had is first successful intercept in May 2012 (FTM-16 E2a). Under current plans, it would begin operational deployment in 2014 on ships equipped with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (or 4.0.2) system and in 2015 at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase II of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

The new Block IB kill vehicle will have a new two-color infrared sensor in its seeker (the sensor in the IA version used only a single color). According to the MDA: “Two-color sensor technology in the SM-3 seeker provides the capability to sense infrared (IR) information in two distinct wavebands, improving the identification of multiple, closely spaced objects.”[3] The new seeker also has improved sensitivity, giving it a greater detection range against longer range targets. In addition, the Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, faster Advanced Signal Processor that “increases data processing capability to sort-out and analyze the information gathered by the upgraded seeker.”[4]

The Block IB kill vehicle also has a new, “more flexible” throttleable divert and attitude control system (TDACS), which improves its divert capabilities.[5] According to reports, the TDACS is able “to dynamically vary its thrust and operating time” and provides higher thrust levels using continuous thrust management to give a greater divert capability than does the pulsed SDACS in the Block IA.[6]

According to the Congressional Research Service, as of 2012, plans called for the procurement of a total of 472 Block IB missiles through fiscal year 2020 (which is the last year for which data is provided).[7] In April 2013, the GAO reported that MDA was developing an upgraded “enhanced capability” SM-3 Block IB which could be fielded in the 2015 time frame “to counter advanced threats expected after 2015.”[8]

The SM-3 Block IIA will have entirely new second and third rocket stages giving it a much higher speed than the Block I missiles. Although no official figures have been released, the Block IA and IB interceptors are typically described as having a burnout speed of about 3.0 km/second, and IIA interceptors about 4.0-4.5 km/second. This higher speed would allow the Block IIB to cover a much larger geographical area than the Block I missiles and to engage some higher-speed intermediate range missiles. The Block IIA will also have a new kill vehicle with increased seeker sensitivity, increased divert capability, and a longer operating time once released from its booster rocket.

The Block IIA interceptor is being jointly developed with Japan and is expected to have its first flight in 2015. It is expected to be deployed operationally in about 2018 with Aegis BMD 5.1 on both ships and at the Polish Aegis Ashore site as part of the EPAA Phase III.

Figure 2. Evolution of the SM-3 Interceptor. (Image source: DeSimone)

The SM-3 Block IIB interceptor would have had an even higher speed booster than the Block IIA missile and have been equipped with a new lighter kill vehicle. Its higher speed was intended to allow it to attempt to intercept potential future Iranian ICBMs from European launch sites. Block IIB would have been initially deployed sometime after 2020 as part of the EPAA Phase IV. In March 2013, the Department of Defense announced the cancellation of the Block IIB program.

The modified SM-2 Block IV is the Navy’s current terminal-phase ballistic missile defense interceptor. The SM-2 Block IV is the Navy’s extended-range air defense interceptor and its airframe is the basis for both the SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors. It operates within the atmosphere and uses semi-active radar homing and has a high-explosive fragmentation warhead. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs have been modified to give them the ability to attempt to intercept ballistic missiles (three of these have been expended in tests).[9] The modifications involved changes to the missile’s fuze and autopilot and are less extensive than the changes that would have been made to produce the SM-2 Block IVA missile (which included, among other things, a new infrared seeker) that was cancelled as part of the Navy Area Defense program in December 2001.

The modified SM-2 Block IV was first intercept tested (successfully) against a ballistic missile target in May 2006 (Pacific Phoenix) and has had two other successful ballistic missile intercept tests since. It began deployment on ships equipped with Aegis BMD 3.6.1 in 2008. The missile is viewed as a stopgap until the BMD version of the SM-6 missile becomes available (currently scheduled for 2015), and it is apparently not compatible with Aegis BMD 4.0.1.

Figure 3. SM-6 compared to SM-2 Block IV. (Image source: DeSimone)

The SM-6, currently undergoing development and testing, is the U.S. Navy’s new extended-range air defense interceptor. It combines the airframe and propulsion system from the current SM-2 Block IV interceptor with the active radar seeker of the current Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) missile. Like the SM-2 Block IV, it operates within the atmosphere and uses a high explosive warhead. The Navy currently plans to buy 1,200 SM-6s.

The initial deployment version of the SM-6 may not have a capability against ballistic missiles. It is to be given an anti-ballistic missile capability as part of the Sea based Terminal (SBT) Increment 1, which is expected to be deployed in 2015 in conjunction with the Aegis 5.0 CU weapons system. This is to be followed in 2018 by SBT Increment 2 in which the SM-6 will be deployed in conjunction with Aegis BMD 5.1 weapons system.[10]

[1]Rear Admiral Brad A. Hicks, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System,” The George C. Marshall Institute, December 19, 2005, Figure 6. Available at: http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/363.pdf.

[2] Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2012, p.7

[3] MDA, “FTM-16 Fact Sheet.” Available at: http://www.stratcom.mil/files/FTM-16%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20v13.pdf.

[4] MDA, “FTM-18 Fact Sheet” June 22, 2012. Available at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/Aegis_FTM-18_FactSheet.pdf

[5] MDA, “Second-Generation Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test,” News Release, May 9, 2012.

[6] Zachary M. Peterson, “Raytheon, ATK Hope To Start Advanced SDACS Flight Tests This Year,” Inside Missile Defense, August 30, 2006; “Raytheon and Aerojet demonstrate SM-3 Throttling Divert and Attitude Control System,” PR Newswire US, August 15, 2006.

[7] O’Rourke, p. 7.

[8] Government Accountability Office, “Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition Management,” GAO-13-437, April 2013, p. 56.

[9] CRS, March 14, 2013, p. 5.

[10] Raytheon Company, “Standard Missile-6,” available at: http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/standard_missile/sm-6/; and Shipman Briefing Slides.

Table of Future Aegis Intercept (mostly) Tests (April 30, 2013) (Updated May 16, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Tue, 30 Apr 2013 14:11:11 +0000

Projected future intercept tests for Aegis SM-3 (with a few significant non-intercept tests). Dates and descriptions are highly subject to change. Most data from FY 2014 (April 2013) budget documentation.

Key for targets: S = short-range (<1,000 km), M = medium range (1,000-3,000 km), IR = intermediate-range (3,000-5,500 km), U = Unitary (warhead does not separate), Sp = separating warhead. For Aegis BMD version, all or some 4.0.1 are now likely 4.0.2, CU = Capability Upgrade. ? = don’t know/not sure.

Click on the table from a more readable version.

Table of Aegis SM-3 Intercept Tests (April 27, 2013) (Updated May 16, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 19:14:31 +0000

Below is table of Aegis SM-3 intercept tests since testing resumed in 2002. Subsequent posts will discuss the Aegis system configurations and individual tests in more detail. Click on either half of the table for a more readable version.

Key for targets: S = short-range (<1,000 km), M = medium range (1,000-3,000 km), IR = intermediate-range (3,000-5,500 km), U = Unitary (warhead does not separate from rocket booster), Sp = separating warhead. For ships, (J) = Japanese destroyer (versions of Aegis BMD weapon may be somewhat different from equivalent US versions listed). ? = don’t know/not sure.

GMD Testing Update (April 17, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 15:18:05 +0000

The recently released FY 2014 Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget justification documentation provides some new details on the MDA’s plans for future tests of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system. In particular, it raises the possibility of carrying out a second non-intercept flight test (CTV-02) before resuming intercept testing using the new CE-II version of the interceptor’s kill vehicle.

As discussed in my previous post on GMD testing, following the failure of the FTG-06a intercept test in December 2010, MDA removed the ten deployed Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) equipped with the CE-II version of the kill vehicle from operational status and suspended deliveries of new GBIs. Deliveries of new GBIs and repairs to the deployed CE-II equipped GBIs were to begin following successful completion of a return-to-intercept (RTI) flight testing program. The RTI program was to consist of a non-intercept flight test (CTV-01) which if successful would be flowed by an intercept test (FTG-06b).

The non-intercept test CTV-1 was conducted on January 26, 2013 and was described, based on preliminary information, as successful. The FY-2014 budget justification states that “Initial results indicate very robust performance of the CE-II kill vehicle.”[1]

However, the budget justification also states that: “In implementing a less concurrent technical approach for the CE-II program, we plan to execute a CTV-02 non-intercept flight test in second quarter 2014 followed by FTG-09 CE-II intercept test in fourth quarter 2014.”[2] On the other hand, the budget materials also indicated that if the success of CTV-01 was assessed to “conclusive,” then instead “we will eliminate CTV-02 in FY 2014 and instead fly the next CE-II intercept flight test (FTG-06b) in 1st quarter FY 2014, and plan to then conduct a second GBI intercept test in late FY 2014.

Note that the CTV-01 test in January was with a CE-II kill vehicle that still contained the part believed to be defective but used mitigations for the problems resulting from the part. Presumably, CTV-02, if it takes place, would use a kill vehicle with the new replacement part (as FTG-06b was planned to do).

At the Pentagon’s March 15 press conference, it was announced that an intercept test using an older CE-I kill vehicle would be conducted this summer. The budget documents state add that this test will be conducted in “in third quarter 2013 to validate reliability improvements made to the CE-I fleet over the last several years. [3] As discussed in a previous post on GBI cost, the GAO estimated that each of the original CE-I GBIs needed repairs and refurbishments that were estimated to cost between $14 and $24 million per interceptor.

Thus the GMD flight tests plans, as far as I have been able to reconstruct them (which may not be completely) now appears to be as follows (all are intercept tests except for CTV-02):

FY 2013, 4^th Q: CE-I intercept test.

FY 2014, 1^st Q: CTV-02 (non-intercept) or FTG-06b (intercept) test of CE-II GBI.

FY 2014, 4^th Q (or FY 2015, 1^st Q): FTG-09 CE-II intercept test.

FY 2015, 4^th Q: FTG-11, salvo (two interceptors) test against ICBM target.

FY 2016, 4^th Q: FTG-15:

FY 2017, 4^th Q: FTG-13: (possibly two stage booster?)

FY 2018, 4^th Q: FTO-03: Operational test with Aegis, THAAD and Patriot.

FY 2019, 4^th Q: FTG-17 (possibly two-stage booster?)

FY 2021, 4^th Q: FTG-12

FY 2022, 4^th Q: FTG-14

[1] Vol. 2a-107.

[2] Vol. 2a-xviii.

[3] Vol. 21-xviii.

Cobra Dane Power Cutback Cancelled (April 10, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 12:09:56 +0000

As discussed in a recent post, as a result of sequestration, the Air Force had planned to reduce operations at several large radars used for space surveillance and ballistic missile defense. One of the radars expected to have its operations cut back was Cobra Dane, a large phased-array radar on Shemya Island at the western end of the Aleutians. According to General William Shelton, Commander of the Air Force Space Command, as a cost saving measure, the plan had been to cut the radar’s operation to one-quarter power for the rest of the year, which would save about $5 million.[1] This reduction would likely be accomplished by reducing the radar’s duty cycle (the fraction of the time it emits radar energy) from 6% to 1.5%, as has been done previously

Cobra Dane, originally built to gather intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile tests, is now also part of the U.S Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which has 30 interceptors deployed in Alaska and Hawaii. It is also an important part of the U.S. space surveillance system, as it can detect and track objects in low Earth orbit down to sizes of about 5 centimeters, significantly smaller than any other radar in the network. Shelton stated that this cutback in power would have temporarily eliminated the radar’s space surveillance role, but that the U.S. had ways to compensate for this loss. Prior to 2003, Cobra Dane had operated at one-quarter power (also for cost reasons), with the ability to return to full power in 30 seconds if a missile test occurred. When full power operation was restored in March 2003, Cobra Dane was able to begin operating a high-elevation space surveillance “fence,” significantly enhancing the space surveillance system’s capabilities.

However, as a result of the ongoing tensions with North Korea, this planned cutback in Cobra Dane’s operations has been cancelled. This reversal is unlikely to affect the other two systems that had been scheduled to have their operations cut back, the large phased array radar at Cavalier Air Station in North Dakota and the Air Force Space Surveillance System at multiple sites in the southern United States, as neither is part of the current U.S. missile defense system.

[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-korea-usa-airforce-idUSBRE93814N20130409

GMD National Missile Defense System Costs over the Last Ten Years (April 5, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 20:19:06 +0000

In a recent post, I cited the GAO estimate that the total cost of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile defense system, projected through FY 2017, was now $40.9 billion (in FY 2013 dollars). I thought it would also be interesting to look back over previous GAO reports to see how the cost of the GMD system has increased over the last decade.

The $40.9 billion figure was reported in the GAO’s March 28, 2013 version of its report on Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. The GAO began releasing this annual report in 2003, although the GMD system was only included starting with the 2004 report. Each report includes a “Latest” cost figure, which is total cost of the GMD system including future costs not yet incurred, projected several years ahead.

The GMD costs appear to include the GBI interceptors and their fire control system, the Sea-Based X-Band radar, and the GMD upgrades to the Cobra Dane and early warning radars, but (probably) not the forward-based TPY-2 X-band radars. It is unclear (to me) to what extent operations and sustainment costs are included (in at least one year they are explicitly excluded). Figure 1 below shows the GMD costs for the ten years the GAO report has been released, starting with the 2004 report (click on the graph to get a larger image).

Figure 1: GAO Total Cumulative Cost for the GMD System, including some future projected costs.

On Figure 1, the x-axis is the date of the data used in the cost estimate. For example, the first point, from the 2004 report, is based on data up to February, 2003 and is thus plotted as x = 2003.17. The y-axis is GAO’s “Latest” cost projection, which is in dollars corresponding to the year of the report and includes costs projected several years ahead.[1] For example, the $22.5 billion point for 2003 is in FY 2004 dollars for costs through FY 2009. The last point is from August, 2012 and is for costs through FY 2017. However, costs associated with the March 15, 2013 announcement of plans to increase the number of deployed GBI interceptors from 30 to 44 are not included in that total.

There are several problems with Figure 1. First, the numbers of years each annual estimate projects ahead varies from year to year. Second, inflation is not taken into account. Figure 2 below attempts to compensate for these two problems by subtracting out the projected funding and by then converting the remaining costs to FY 2013 dollars.[2] Figure 2 is thus a plot of the amount spent on the GMD system through the date shown in constant FY 2013 dollars.

Figure 2: GMD actual costs (no future projections) in FY 2013 dollars.

If we assume the zero point for GMD costs is February 1996, which the GAO takes as the starting date for their cost estimates, then as Figure 3 below shows, the data fits surprisingly well to a linear increase over time.

Figure 3. GMD actual costs fitted to linear plot with a February 1996 starting date.

Nevertheless, it is clear from looking at the ten plotted data points that the rate of GMD spending has slowed up somewhat in the last four or five years relative to the five previous years. This is hardly surprising, since much of the system was deployed by 2010 (for example, the 30^th GBI interceptor was deployed in September 2010).

[1] For the 2005 and 2006 estimates, the GAO gives projections for both FY 2009 and FY 2011. The FY 2011 figures are used here, since these are more consistent the numbers of years projected ahead used in other years.

[2] The correction for inflation is based on data from table 10.1 of the U.S. Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, Historical Tables (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist.pd). The chained price index (which the table states is what used for constant dollar research and development outlays) was used.

First THAAD Deployment Is to Guam (April 3, 2013)

mostlymissiledefense — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 22:09:35 +0000

Less than three weeks after Department of Defense officials incorrectly stated that Guam was covered by the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) national missile system, the Department announced today that a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery would be deployed to Guam. The U.S. currently has two deployable THAAD batteries with a third undergoing training, all at Fort Bliss, Texas, and currently plans to buy a total of six, although this number could increase. Each battery consists of a TPY-2 X-band radar, up to six launchers (although the current batteries only have three each), each of which can carry as many as eight interceptor missiles, and a fire control system.

This would be the first operational deployment of a THAAD battery away from Fort Bliss. In June 2009, in response to indications of North Korean plans to test a long-range missile, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that a THAAD battery had been deployed to Hawaii.[1] However, this was only a temporary activation of THAAD components that happened to be in Hawaii at that time for testing purposes.[2] As of late 2009, the U.S. Army planned to deploy both Patriot and THAAD batteries to Guam, but this never took place.

One interesting question that announcement raises is: Once the system is deployed in Guam, under what circumstances could it ever be removed?

[1] Viola Glenger and Tony Capaccio, “Gates Order Measures Against North Korea Missile (update2),” Bloomberg.com, June 18, 2009; Peter Foster, “N. Korea May Fire Missile At Hawaii, Report Says; U.S. Prepared: Gates,” National Post (Canada), June 19, 2009, p. A15.

[2] Amy Butler, “THAAD Turnaround,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 17, 2009, p. 38.