RAND has just released a report on ballistic missile countermeasure technologies. The Report: “Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses” by Richard H Speier, K. Scott McMahon, and George Macouziis is primarily about using the Missile Technology Control Regime to attempt to limit the spread of countermeasures technology, it also has a number of interesting figures illustrating countermeasures approaches. The Report is available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR378.html.
All posts by mostlymissiledefense
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on February 28, 2014
The full transcript of the House Armed Services Committee’s May 8, 2013 hearing on ballistic missile defenses was posted by the Government Printing Office this week. The responses to written questions from the Committee members contain some interesting new (to me, at least) information:
(1) The distinction between a “hit” and a “kill” now seems to be classified, at least for the Ground-Based Midcourse System’s GBI hit-to-kill interceptors. (For background on this point, including the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s assessment that he scored the successful FTG-02 intercept test as a ‘hit” but not a “kill”, see my post of October 18, 2012.) From the transcript, here are questions to MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring:
Mr. COOPER. 16) In tests of the GBI, is a ‘‘hit’’ considered a ‘‘kill’’? Are there any successful intercept tests where a hit would have not equated to a kill of the target? How do these assumptions impact the reliability of the GMD system?
Admiral SYRING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]
(2) Some other things that are now apparently classified:
(a) Whether or not Aegis SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors deployed on U.S. territory could intercept missiles from Iran. (p. 81) (Comment: MDA has not never stated (as far as I know) that the Block I interceptors were effective against ICBMs, although one has been used to shoot down a satellite.)
(b) Whether or not Aegis ships or Aegis Ashore are being considered for defense of the U.S. East Coast. (pp. 83 and 84) (Comment: MDA has previously said that all options were under consideration.)
(c) How the number (fourteen) of additional GBI interceptors to be deployed by 2017 was determined. (p. 83) (Comment: Probably the fact that there were fourteen additional silos available had something to do with the decision.)
(3) The MDA is developing a new, upgraded version of the CE-II GBI, to be called the CE-II Block I GBI. (Its full name is apparently “Common Booster Avionics and Obsolescence Design (CBAU/CE-II Block I”). It is currently scheduled for a first intercept test in FY 2016 and the fourteen additional GBIs announced in March 2013 will be of this type. (p. 87). (Correction, February 17: changed this point to reflect that the 14 new Block I GBIs will not be the ones deployed by FY 2017 but instead the ones purchased beginning in 2016, and removed point about “fly before you buy”)
(4) The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) statement that: “We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles,” including North Korea and Iran, “would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses … by the time they flight test their missiles,” is also MDA’s current assessment of the missile threat. This was confirmed by Madelyn Creedon, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, by MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring, and by Michael Gilmore, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. (pp. 83-84, 85-86, 88)
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on February 14, 2014
As discussed in my post of December 24, 2012, the FY 2013 Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide a report to Congress on testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. Specifically the report was to assess “the feasibility, advisability, and cost-effectiveness of accelerating the date for testing the GMD system against an ICBM-range target, and of conducting GMD flight tests at a pace of three tests every 2 years.”
Yesterday, Inside Defense SITREP reported that DoD’s response, which was delivered to Congress last fall but has not been publicly released, said that neither increase in the pace of testing was feasible. As I noted in my December 24 post, such a response was to be expected given previous statements by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).
However, if anything, it now appears possible that the test against an ICBM target may actually be further delayed rather than accelerated. For the last several years, MDA and DOT&E have been saying that the first GMD intercept of an ICBM target would take place in fiscal year 2015 (specifically in the 3rd quarter of calendar year 2015). Now, according to MDA spokesman Richard Lehner, the plan is for “a flight test against an ICBM target in the 2015-2016 time frame when an appropriate ICBM target becomes available.”
The report to Congress also repeated MDA’s argument (again see my post of December 24, 2012) that a GMD test pace of more than one test per year was not feasible because of the complexity of the tests. (In comparison, in 2013 the MDA conducted five successful intercept tests of exo-atmospheric SM-3 Aegis BMD interceptors in less than eight months – from February 12 to October 3.)
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on February 13, 2014
According to a recent news report, the United States plans to spend nearly $1 billion dollars on a new missile defense radar in Alaska. This radar is intended to increase the discrimination capability of the current U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system. Although no details on the radar have been publicly released, it will certainly be some sort of X-band phased-array radar (“X-band” indicates an operating frequency of about 10 GHz). So how much X-band radar can you get for a billion dollars? And does this price tell us anything about the likely nature of the radar? As will be seen below, there are at least several possibilities
A TPY-2 X-band radar.
The U.S. currently has eight TPY-2 X-band radars, with four more under construction. These air-transportable radars are relatively inexpensive, costing about $180-200 million each including supporting equipment. However, these radars are far too small (in terms of the power and antenna aperture) for the GMD discrimination mission.
A TPY-2 radar and supporting equipment. (Image source: MDA)
A“Stacked” TPY-2 radar
A 2012 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report called for deploying five “stacked” TPY-2 radars at five sites (including one in Alaska) as GMD discrimination radars. These radars would use two TPY-2 antennas, stacked one on top of the other on a turntable, giving an eight-fold increase in the radar’s power-aperture-gain (an appropriate figure of merit for a discrimination radar) relative to a TPY-2 radar. According to the NAS Report, once developed, such a radar would cost about $320 million each to build in batch of five. The NAS puts the cost of developing the radar at $0.8-1.0 billion. Thus the cost of developing and deploying just one stacked radar would be about $1.1-1.3 billion. The Department of Defense’s estimated cost of a stacked TPY-2 is “at least $500 million (see next paragraph), so this option would seem to be possible for the “nearly $1 billion” figure cited for the proposed new radar.
However, the MDA does not seem to be favorably inclined to the stacked TPY-2 proposal. A February 2013 Department of Defense report to Congress concludes that: “The cost to build a stacked AN/TPY-2 radar array would be at least $500 million. Alternative concepts would provide a more robust capability for less cost.” Moreover, while the range of such a stacked radar would be much greater than that of a TPY-2 radar, it would be significantly less than other X-band radar options.
An Upgraded GBR-P
A third option would be to take the existing Ground-Based Radar – Prototype (GBR-P) X-band radar at the U.S. test range on Kwajalein Atoll and move it to Alaska, probably with some significant upgrades. This radar is no longer being used for testing and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the total cost of upgrading and moving the radar (to the U.S. East Coast) to be $510 million. (See my post of August 6, 2013). The GBR-P was designed to be upgradeable, and under the George W. Bush Administration’s now-cancelled European Missile Defense plan, it would have been moved to the Czech Republic and renamed the European Midcourse Radar. Depending on the extent of the upgrades (see my post of June 11, 2013), this radar could have a significantly greater range than a stacked TPY-2. However, it would also have a very limited electronic field of view, which could limit its capability to deal with attacks by multiple missiles. In addition, it is likely that the MDA will want to deploy at least one more large X-band radar (for example, on the East Coast) and there is only one GBR-P (although, as discussed next, the SBX could also be redeployed).
The GBR-P under construction (Image source: http://www.boeing.com/boeing/companyoffices/gallery/images/space/gmd/973897.page)
A Land-Based SBX
A fourth option would be to build another Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, but to place it on land rather than on a ship. The SBX is generally described as costing about $0.9-1.0 billion. However, roughly $250 million of this cost was for the modified ocean-going oil drilling platform it is deployed on. Thus it seems at least possible that a land-based version of the SBX could be built for about $1 billion, even though the SBX was built for test purposes, and some additional costs would likely be involved in building it to operational standards of reliability and survivability. This option would give greater range than any of the other options above, but like the upgraded GBR-P, it would have a limited electronic field of view. Alternatively, the SBX itself could be removed from its ocean-going platform, upgraded, and redeployed on land. (The NAS Report called for moving the SBX ashore, although it proposed placing the radar on Adak Island in the Aleutians rather than the new radar’s likely central Alaska location.)
The SBX radar under construction. (Image source: MDA)
Or Some Other Option
Other possibilities exist. The new Cobra Judy radar ship has an X-band phased array radar with an aperture similar to that of the GBR-P. However, no details about this radar’s other characteristics or cost appear to be publicly available. Or MDA could choose an entirely new radar design, although this would seem likely to cost substantially more than $1 billion.
The new Cobra Judy radar ship, with its S-band and X-band radar antennas. (Image source: http://www.riversideresearch.org/coe/radar)
 NAS Report, p. 274.
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Stacked AN/TPY-2 Array Concept Report to Congress,” February 2013.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on February 7, 2014
The FY 2013 DOT&E Report and the GMD System. What does “demonstrated capability” mean? (January 29, 2013)
The FY 2013 Annual Report from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is now available. Its short (two pages) section on the Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) national missile defense system has already gained notice for its recommendation that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) should consider re-designing the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) of the GMD interceptor. Although this might seem like a harsh criticism, it is probably consistent with what the MDA was already planning to do anyway (more on this in a future post).
What most caught my attention about the GMD section of the report was, first, the claim that the GMD system had a demonstrated capability against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and, second, that the January 2013 CTV-01 GMD flight test might not be the complete success it has been portrayed as:
(1) The first bullet point in the GMD section of the 2013 Report states that the “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has demonstrated a partial capability to defend the U.S. Homeland from small numbers of simple intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea or Iran.”
In standard usage, at least in a missile defense context, the word “demonstrated” means that a capability has been shown to work in an actual successful intercept test. Indeed the word is used in precisely this way in several other parts of the GMD section of the 2013 DOT&E Report.
However, as is well known, the operational GMD system has never been tested against an ICBM-range target, nor against more than one target at a time. So how has the GMD system’s effectiveness been “demonstrated” against either ICBMs or against “small numbers” of missiles of any range? (Unless one reads the word “partial” to mean not against ICBMs and not against more than one missile
Two years ago, the 2011 DOT&E Report contained the more specific assessment that “Ground test results suggest that the GMD system provides a limited capability for the defense of the U.S. Homeland against emerging intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missile threats.”
Given that there has been no successful intercept test (only two failures) of the GMD system since that 2011 assessment, it is hard to see how the GMD system has progressed from a capability “suggested by ground tests” to a “demonstrated” capability. This contradiction is highlighted by the second bullet point in the 2013 GMD section, which states that: “The performance of GMD during flight tests in FY13 prevented any improvement in the assessment of GMD capability.”
(2) The Report contains the first public indication (at least that I am aware of) that CTV-01 test of January 2013 was not an unqualified success. CTV-01 test was a non-intercept test intended to show that the problem that caused the failure of the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle in the previous intercept test, FTG-06a in December 2010, had been correctly identified. All previous public discussions of the test seemed to indicate that CTV-01 was complete success. For example, in his prepared statement to the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 17, 2013, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring stated that: “The successful non-intercept controlled flight test of the next generation CE-II GBI earlier this year (CTV-01) gives us confidence and cautious optimism we have addressed the causes of the FTG-06a endgame failure in December 2010 and are on the right track for a successful return to intercept using the redesigned EKV.”
However the DOT&E Report’s description (six months after Syring’s statement above) of the outcome of this test was somewhat less glowing, saying that “The GBI boost vehicle and the CE-II EKV with the redesigned component performed adequately and mostly as expected.” It went on to say that: “The MDA noted several unexpected results that did not negatively affect test execution or data collection. The MDA is analyzing these unexpected results to determine if any of them pose a risk to GBI operational or test performance.”
 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. Should Consider Re-Design of Missile Defense System: Report,” Reuters, January 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-usa-missile-defense-idUSBREA0S0ED20140129?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on January 29, 2014
Flight tests of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system since
developmental testing resumed in 2005 and planned future tests.
FTT-01 (November 22, 2005: First launch of an operationally-configured THAAD interceptor. The launch, conducted at the White Sands Test Range (WSMR), successfully demonstrated the operation of missile and kill vehicle, although no target was used and thus no intercept was attempted. The THAAD TPY-2 radar does not appear to have participated in this test.
FTT-02 (May 11, 2006): Second flight test of operational THAAD interceptor. No actual target was used. This was the first test to include all of the THAAD system components, including the TPY-2 radar. The radar provided simulated target data to the THAAD fire control system. Test was conducted at WSMR and was reported as successful.
FTT-03 (July 12, 2006): First intercept attempt and first successful intercept using an operational interceptor. The target was a non-separating, short-range missile (a Hera missile) and the intercept took place in the high endoatmosphere. It was an integrated system test in which the THAAD TPY-2 radar acquired and tracked the target and provided in-flight updates. Test was conducted at WSMR.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on January 27, 2014
An update on some recent developments on Aegis BMD as it moves towards the deployment of the Aegis Ashore site with SM-3 Block IB interceptors in Romania in 2015.
The first two Aegis Ashore intercept tests, planned for the end of 2014. Image Source: MDA
Block IB Intercept Tests
In September and October, MDA conducted two successful initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) intercept tests of the Block IB interceptor, FTM-21 on September 18 and FTM-22 on October 3. These were the fourth and fifth consecutive successful intercept tests for the Block IB after its first intercept attempt failed in September 2011. FTM-21 was a salvo test (two interceptors against one short-range missile target) with the first interceptor hitting the target warhead. FTM-22 was the first tests of a Block IB interceptor against a medium-range target. At the time it was conducted, FTM-22 was described by MDA as the highest altitude SM-3 intercept ever (with the previous high of about 247 km occurring in the 2008 satellite intercept). However, MDA subsequently stated that the FTM-22 intercept occurred at a lower altitude than anticipated and thus was not the highest altitude intercept. [Added January 22: Lockheed Spokesperson says that as a result of FTM-22 intercept being lower than expected, the previous test FTM-21 is highest intercept. See: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/aegis-bmd-passes-key-test-multiple-launches-targets-next/]
Next Block IB Tests and IB Production
Two more intercept tests of the Block IB interceptor (FTM-23, FTM-24) are planned for the first half of 2014. Assuming these are successful, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation may then issue a final IOT&E report as early as July 2014. In a standard military procurement program, a positive IOT&E report is required before full-rate production of a system can begin. However, MDA systems are exempt from the regulations, and so it is possible that a full-production decision for Block IB interceptors could be made sooner. In his July 2013 written statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee, MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring stated that FTM-21 and FTM-22 “will support a full-rate production decision” on the SM-3 Block IB with 39 of the missiles to be delivered by the end of 2014. (Current MDA plans call for buying 52 Block IBs in FY 2014, followed by 72 per year in FY 2015 through FY 2018. Numbers for years after 2018 have not been released.)
First Aegis Destroyer to Spain Next Month
As part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), four U.S. Aegis BMD equipped destroyers are to be home ported at the Spanish port of Rota. The first of these ships, the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) is now scheduled to arrive there in February. All four ships are to arrive in Rota before the end of 2015.
Ceremonies for Aegis Ashore in Romania
A ground-breaking ceremony for the planned Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania was held on October 28 2013. The same month, a ceremony was held in Moorestown, New Jersey to mark the “light-off” – the beginning of testing — of the Aegis Ashore system destined for Romania. According to current plans, following testing in New Jersey, the Aegis equipment and the deckhouse housing both it and the radar hardware will be dismantled and shipped to Romania in time to be operational in 2015.
Aegis Ashore Testing
The “light off” ceremony for Aegis Ashore test system at the U.S. Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) test range on Hawaii was held in early December. As will be the case for the Romania site, the Aegis system was originally set up in and tested in New Jersey before being moved to Hawaii (although a new deckhouse was built in Hawaii instead of moving the one in new Jersey). The first two Aegis Ashore intercept tests (AA FTM-01 and AA FTM-02, both using the Aegis BMD 5.0 system and SM-3 Block IB interceptors) are currently scheduled for the last quarter of 2014.
 Briefing Slides, MDA Deputy Director Rear Admiral Randall B. Hendrickson, 2012 Space and Missile Defense Conference, August 14, 2012
 Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IB Completes IOT&E with a Bang, Full rate Production Review,” Inside Missile Defense, October 16, 2013.
 Jason Sherman, “Key Report on SM-3 IB Effectiveness, Suitability Expected Next Summer,” Inside Defense SITREP, November 13, 2013.
 Megan Eckstein, “Lockheed Martin, NAVY, MDA Complete Light off for Second Aegis Ashore System,” Defense Daily, November 4, 2013.
 Lara Seligman, “Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Ashore System Completes ‘Light Off’ at PMRF,” Inside Defense SITREP, January 13, 2013.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on January 20, 2014
Updated list of claims by U.S. government officials about the effectiveness of the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) System. This iteration adds four additional claims (mostly older). They are #4, #9, #26 and #28 below. Also added is a quote (#29) on defending Guam, since Guam is U.S. territory but is not covered by the GMD system.
(1) September 1, 2000: “… I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time.” President Bill Clinton, at Georgetown University, September 1, 2000.
(2) March 18, 2003: “Effectiveness is in the 90% range.” Edward Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
(3) March 23, 2003: “There are a lot of things that go into [determining] effectiveness. Everybody can be right.”  MDA Director Ronald Kadish, in response to a question about Aldridge’s statement.
(4) July 21, 2005: “We have a better than zero chance of intercepting, I believe, an inbound warhead.” That confidence will improve with time.” MDA Director Lt. General Henry Obering.
(5) March 14, 2006: “When the president declares limited defensive operational capability, we are prepared as the shooter, if you will, to execute the mission to defend our country. And I’m very confident in the efficacy of that system.” Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command.
(6) June 2006: “(From) what I have seen and what I know about the system and its capabilities I am very confident.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.
(7) July 6, 2006: “If it headed to the United States, we’ve got a missile defense system that will defend our country.” President George W. Bush in response to a question on Larry King Live about North Korea’s unsuccessful test of a long-range ballistic missile the day before.
(8) September 1, 2006: “I would say that if we had to use the system in an operational mode, it would be very capable.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.
(9) January 29, 2007: “We are Confident The Ballistic Missile Defense System Would Have Operated As Designed Had The Taepo Dong-2 Threatened The U.S.,” MDA Deputy Director Brigadier General Patrick O’Reilly.
(10) October 2, 2007: “ - does the system work? The answer to that is yes. Is it going to work against more complex threats in the future? We believe it will.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering.
(11) November 2, 2008: “I have very high confidence we could defend the United States against that threat.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, about one or two missiles launched from North Korea.
(12) March 27, 2009: “And Senator, I’ll tell you, if we felt the North Koreans were going to shoot a ballistic missile at us today, I am comfortable that we would have an effective system able to meet that threat.” General Victor Renaurt, Commander U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Transportation Command.
(13) June 9, 2009: “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.” And “I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.
(14) June 16, 2009: Confidence that a North Korean missile could be shot down is: “ninety percent plus.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.
(15) June 18, 2009 (approximately): “I’d believe we have a reasonable chance” of intercepting a North Korean missile. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary, in an interview on his last day in the job.
(16) July 28, 2009:“Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea.” MDA Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly.
(17) April 21, 2010:“It is the belief of the — of the leaders of this department that we have the capability to defend the United States against the — against an ICBM threat from a rogue nation such as Iran or North Korea. We are confident in the system we have at this point.” Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary.
(18) December 1, 2010: “…the probability will be well in the high 90s today of the GMD system being able to intercept that today.” MDA Director Patrick O’Reilly in response to a question from Representative Trent Franks about countering “one ICBM coming from Tehran to New York.”
(19) April 13, 2011:“The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures.” Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.
(20) December 12, 2012: “I’m very confident that American defense capabilities are able, no problem, to block a rocket like this one.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in response to a question from CNN on the capability of U.S missile defenses, December 12, 2012.
(21) March 7, 2013: “I can tell you that the United States is fully capable of defending against any North Korean ballistic missile attack. And our recent success in returning to testing of the upgraded version of the so-called GBI, or the CE2 missile, will keep us on a good trajectory to improve our defense capability against limited ballistic missile threats such as those from North Korea. But let’s be clear, we are fully capable of dealing with that threat.” White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in response to a question at White House Daily Press Briefing, March 7, 2013.
(22) March 15, 2013: “We have confidence in our system. And we certainly will not go forward with the additional 14 interceptors until we are sure that we have the complete confidence that we will need. But the American people should be assured that our interceptors are effective.” Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in response to a question at a Pentagon press conference, March 15, 2013.
(23) April 9, 2013: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies. Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013 in response to a question about intercepting North Korean missiles.
(24) May 9, 2013: “We do have confidence in the ability of the ballistic missile defense system to defend the United States against a limited attack from both North Korea and Iran today and in the near future.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall about the capability of “our current GMD system to defend all of the United States, including the East Coast, against current and near-term ballistic missile threats from both North Korea and Iran?”
(25) May 9, 2013: “The East Coast is well-protected as the result of — well, it was protected before the additional — and this additional ’14 provides additional protection both for anything from North Korea as well as anything from Iran should that threat develop.” Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Defense Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, in response to a question from Senator Mark Udall (and referring to the recently announced plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska).
(26) July 2013: “I stand by my response in the testimony I provided on May 9.” Lt. General Richard Formica, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, when asked about the effectiveness of the GMD System shortly after failure of FTG-07 on July 5, 2013.
(27) July 10, 2013: “But we maintain that we have a robust missile defense system in place to defend the United States and our allies from a range of threats.” “We have a range of assets that can support American missile defense, and we are confident that we can defend this country from the missile threat.” Pentagon Press Secretary George Little , July 9 2013 (four days after the failed FTG-07 intercept test of the GMD system).
(28) Sometime before August 21, 2013: “Of course you’re protected. Yes, you’re protected. We’re proud to protect you.” MDA Director Vice Admiral James Syring, in response to the question “Am I protected where I live?” asked by a person sitting next to him on an airplane.
Bonus Quote on Defending Guam from a North Korean Missile Attack:
(29) April 5, 2013: THAAD together with other systems such as Aegis and Patriot could take out a missile launched by North Korea at Guam “fairly quickly.” “We are very confident of that.” Major General Dana J. H. Pittard (Commander of Fort Bliss, home base for THAAD).
BAYH: Let me withdraw the question and move on. I think you see where I was heading. Let me ask you Mr. — Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness of the system that’s to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in protecting against this developing North Korean threat — the 10 land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004 — how effective would they be against the North Korean missile if it were, in fact, launched against our country? ALDRIDGE: Well, we think that it would be effective. Probably shouldn’t go into a lot of details of… BAYH: Well, how do you define effective — 90 percent success rate — 75 — 50? ALDRIDGE: Yes, sir — you would — and you — the way you could achieve these rates is you don’t have to fire just one interceptor per target, you could fire two, as we do in PAC-3. BAYH: Of course. ALDRIDGE: And so the effectiveness is in the 90 percent range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough that we never have to use these things. I mean, that’s the ultimate effectiveness is that they’re never used. BAYH: There are — there are — there are — there are 10 going online in 2004 — 10 in 2005. The radar is not going to be available — when will that go into place — 2006? ALDRIDGE: Well, General Kadish has probably got the specific dates for all of those. Let him… KADISH: We’ll have radars online to handle the early warning and usefulness of the system in ’04, when we put the missiles on alert if everything works out all right. We’ll add the sea-based X-band (ph) if it proves out by — the following year — it’s currently scheduled by September of ’05. BAYH: So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal year ’04 and the radar that will be online at that time, we would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down a NATO (ph) Dong II? ALDRIDGE: Well, it depends on — a lot depends on the continuation of the — of the test and the effective — this precise effectiveness numbers. But I would put — you know, as of today, the projected effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2003.
 Randy Barrett. “Lawmakers Question Effectiveness of Missile Defense System.” Space News, March 24, 2003, p. 6.
 Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Missile Defense Being Expanded, General Says,” The Washington Post, p. A10, July 22, 2005.
 Jason Sherman, “Experts Question U.S. System’s Ability To Intercept North Korean Missile,” Inside Missile Defense, June 21, 2006.
 Robert Burns, “Missile Defense Chief Confident in Ability To Hit Missile,” The Associated Press State and Local Wire, June 23, 2006.
 Pentagon Briefing, September 1, 2006.
 “Missile Defense Program Overview For The Washington Roundtable On Science And Public Policy,” MDA Briefing Slides, Januaary 29, 2007.
 “DoD News Briefing with Gen. Renuart and Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.”, October 2, 2007.
 “Obama To Be Told U.S. Missile Defense Capable, General Says,” CNN.com, November 2, 2008.
 Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2009.
 “I think that the judgement and advice I got was that the 30 silos we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.”
“I was just in Fort Greely last week, and its an immensly capable system.” And one of the things that I think is important to remember is, it is still a developmental system. It has real capabilities, and I have confidence that if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.”
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 9, 2009.
 SEN Bayh: I’ve bumped up against my time limits here, but there was one final question. You’re briefing the President of the United States. He asks you based on — you know, he’s got to take into consideration what you’re doing in terms of facing these threats. He asks you if there is a rogue launch, what are the percentages that we’re going to be able to hit it and bring it down, what would you tell him?
GEN. O’Reilly: Ninety percent plus.
SEN. Bayh: Ninety percent plus confidence that we could — if there’s a rogue launch from North Korea, let’s say, we could intercept that target and bring it down?
Gen. O’Reilly: Yes. Sir.
Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009.
 Viola Gienger, “Gates: Take Defense Steps,” The Salt Lake Tribune, June 18, 2009.
 Gen O’ Reilly: ‘Well, we have a very proven missile system in the area of missiles coming out of North Korea. The testing we have done to date, we have a lot of testing still to do against all our capability in all scenarios, but in the scenarios out of North Korea, we have intercepted three times out of Fort Greely, Alaska. The missiles, we actually test them out of Vandenberg, but they’re up at Fort Greely. And then for Hawaii, we have multiple systems (inaudible). A theater high-altitude-area defense system, its an Army mobile system, and then we have the Navy Aegis system. And we also have the…” Margaret Brennan, “US Missile Defense Director Patrick O’Reilly on Bloomberg TV,” Bloomberg TV, July 28, 2009.
“DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4612. Morrell is the Pentagon Press Secretary.
 Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, December 1, 2010.
 “Now what does that mean? The posture we have today is one that has us well-protected against the initial ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and Iran with — that are few in number, relatively slow and lack sophisticated countermeasures. And against this threat, we have the current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to come in the defense of the homeland with the future deployment in 2020 time frame of SM-3 2B.” Opening statement of Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2011.
 Bradley Clapper, “U.S. Hesitant in Condemning North Korean Launch,” The Associated Press, December 13, 2012.
The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” March 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/07/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-372013
 SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that we have the ability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch a missile, as is widely reported they would do in coming days.
ADM. LOCKLEAR: I believe we have a credible ability to defend the Homeland, to defend Hawaii, to defend Guam, to defend our forward-deployed forces and defend our allies.
SEN. MCCAIN: Do we have the capability to intercept a missile if the North Koreans launch within the next several days?
ADM. LOCKLEAR: We do.
 Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.
 Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 9, 2013.
 Jason Sherman, “Top Army General Still Confident ib=n GMD System Despite Intercept Test Failure,” Inside Defense SITREP, July 10, 2013.
 U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense News Briefing with George Little,” News Transcript, July 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5269.
 Donna Miles, “Missile Defenders Trained, Ready for Deployment, General Says,” American Forces Press Service, April 5, 2013.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on January 16, 2014
The MDA has announced that yesterday it conducted a successful intercept test of an SM-3 Block IB interceptor against a seperating medium-range target. This test, designated FTM-22 , would be the fifth successful intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB after the first intercept test failed. The MDA has previously stated that successfully completing FTM-22 would allow full rate production of the Block IB interceptor to begin.
The image below (from MDA) was made before test.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on October 4, 2013
Here is an updated table of Aegis BMD intercept tests (see note below the table for how to view a much more readable version of the table).
Target Key: S = short-range, M = medium-range, IR = intermediate range, U = unitary (non-separating), Sp = separating
Click on the rectangular icon at the right (next to the plus and minus magnifiers) to get a much more readable version.
Posted by mostlymissiledefense on September 20, 2013